One case of a logically possible state of affairs which it is logicallyimpossible for anyone to bring about arises where the state of affairsis a state of the universe before the time at which abilities to bringit about are being assessed.
要[因]和[媒介]導引一個過去的事件是邏輯不可能的。
因此﹐Swinburne 說全能這個定義需要考量時間這個維度。
因此﹕(C) - a person P is omnipotent at a time t if and only if he is able to bring about any (logically possible) state of affairs after t.
但是 (C)還不理想﹐因為(C)要求 P 的全能條件是﹕如果P要在1976年裡全能的話﹐P需要導引一些沒原因的事件或不是P引起的事件發生在19 77年。這些是發生在1976年後的邏輯偶然事件。要P導引這些邏輯偶然事件是邏輯不可能的。我們也不會因 此說P不全能。
因此(C)需要進一步修改成(D)﹕
a person P is omnipotent at a time t if and only if he is able to bring about any logically contingent state of affairs after t, the description of which does not entail that P did not bring it about at t.
(p156)
_______
待續
Swinburne 最後考慮到第八章的全然自由定義﹕
a perfectly free person can only perform an action if he believes that there is no overriding reason for refraining from doing it.
因此﹐Swinburne 的最終版本 (E) 是﹕
a person P is omnipotent at a time t if and only if he is able to bring about the existence of any logically contingent state of affairs x after t, the description of the occurrence of which does not entail that P did not bring it about at t, given that he does not believe that he has overriding reason for refraining from bringing about x.
Swinburne認為他們miss the point。Wade Savage 指出石頭悖論的重點是指出全能的概念是不協調的(incoherent﹐怎麼翻譯呢﹖) 他重塑石頭悖論為﹕
Where P is any being
(1) Either P can create a stone which P cannot lift, or P cannot create a stone which P cannot lift.
(2) If P can create a stone which P cannot lift, then, necessarily, there is at least one task which P cannot perform (namely, lift the stone in question).
(3) If P cannot create a stone which P cannot lift, then, necessarily, there is at least one task which P cannot perform (namely create the stone in question).
(4) Hence there is at least one task which P cannot perform.
(5) If P is an omnipotent being, then P can perform any task.
(6) Therefore P is not omnipotent.
Wade Savage的解決方案是指出(3)不是必然的真。他說﹕?P cannot create a stone which P cannot lift? can only mean ?If P can create a stone, then P can lift it?. 後一句不能說明P的能力是有限的。
Where P is any being
(1) Either P can at t bring about the existence of a stone of which P cannot subsequently bring about the rising, or P cannot at t bring about the existence of a stone of which P cannot subsequently bring about the rising.
(2) If at t, P can bring about the existence of a stone of which P cannot subsequently bring about the rising, then necessarily there is at least one logically contingent state of affairs after t, the description of which does not entail that P did not bring it about at t, which P is unable at t to bring about (namely, the rising of the stone in question).
(3) If at t, P cannot bring about the existence of a stone of which P cannot subsequently bring about the rising, then necessarily there is at least one logically contingent state of affairs after t, the description of which does not entail that P did not bring it about at t, which P is unable at t to bring about (namely, the existence of such a stone.)
(4) Hence there is at least one logically contingent state of affairs after t, the description of which does not entail that P did not bring it about at t, which P is unable at t to bring about.
(5) If P is an omnipotent being, then P is able to bring about any logically contingent state of affairs after t, the description of which does not entail that P did not bring it about at t.
根据Swinburne 的最終版本 (E) ﹕
a person P is omnipotent at a time t if and only if he is able to bring about the existence of any logically contingent state of affairs x after t, the description of the occurrence of which does not entail that P did not bring it about at t, given that he does not believe that he has overriding reason for refraining from bringing about x.
在 t 的时限中我们相信
P CAN control that P cannot lift the stone.
在 t 之后，我们也相信
P CAN control that P can lift the stone which could not be lifted previously.
在 t 的时限中我们相信
P CAN control that P cannot lift the stone. ...
Crathen_Spiroth, 您好﹐
在哲學的討論中﹐石頭悖論的主要目的不是針對上帝﹐而是全能概念(分析A)的矛盾性(or the attribute to God, not God Himself)。因此Swinburne 沒馬上回答石頭悖論﹐而是慢慢地列出全能概念(分析A)的不邏輯性﹐然後漸漸地將它修改探討直到他認為沒有邏輯矛盾為止。這個全能的概念可以加給任何符合條件的存有(being)或位格(person)。Swinburne認為分析D已足于解決石頭悖論。不過我認為他似乎有用到分析E裡的全然自由這個概念(肯定後才和各位分享Swinburne的答案)。
Swinburne 用的是普遍理性﹐則宗教徒和非宗教徒都能認同的。因此他有一個前設﹐則時間是直線的。(linear and unidirectional)
全能包括能自限...我之前提的 "P CAN control that P cannot lift the stone“ 可说是个自限的例子巴。
在哲学中，Swinburne “全能”的 definition 是：
“A person P is omnipotent at a time t if and only if he is able to bring about the existence of any logically contingent state of affairs x after t, the description of the occurrence of which entails that P brought it about at t, given that he does not believe that he has overriding reason for refraining from bringing about x.”
这就为“全能”的基本definition ”If P is an omnipotent being, then P can perform any task“ 加上了time, logic, 和 reason 的限制。因此如果哲学家要试验P是否全能时，他们就要一个不会违背time, logic, 和 reason 的试验。For this case, they came up with the stone lifting paradox.
原帖由 Crathen_Spiroth 于 17-11-2008 04:07 PM 发表
全能包括能自限...我之前提的 " CAN control that P cannot lift the stone“ 可说是个自限的例子巴。
Crathen_Spiroth﹐您好﹐
我大致明白您的意思。有一個意見﹐則您在以上命題裡用了一個詞 - control (這個的定義又是什麼呢﹖)。由於我們在承續Swinburne的討論﹐那麼還是不要添加新詞﹐不然可能會open a can of worm (意則討論很可能會被扯遠) 。Swinburne這樣形容[ 自限 ] - cease to be omnipotent (at a time after t) 當然您可以嘗試定義control, 探討您為何用control, 然後嘗試回答石頭悖論。
原帖由 Crathen_Spiroth 于 17-11-2008 04:07 PM 发表
在哲学中，Swinburne “全能”的 definition 是：
“A person P is omnipotent at a time t if and only if he is able tobring about the existence of any logically contingent state of affairsx after t, the description of the occurrence of which entails that Pbrought it about at t, given that he does not believe that he hasoverriding reason for refraining from bringing about x.”
这就为“全能”的基本definition ”If P is an omnipotent being, then P can performany task“ 加上了time, logic, 和 reason 的限制。因此如果哲学家要试验P是否全能时，他们就要一个不会违背time,logic, 和 reason 的试验。For this case, they came up with the stone liftingparadox.
我想這不是一種限制﹐而是一種邏輯考量(邏輯一致否﹐有沒有邏輯不可能等等)。
原帖由 Crathen_Spiroth 于 17-11-2008 04:07 PM 发表
P 能创造一个他不能拿起的石头呢？这个问题能改说成：
因此﹐Swinburne 放棄使用 [do] 而用 [bring about state of affairs x after t]。
P能改換P在t時間後的特定類型。
之前的一個例子可以說明﹕ 沒結婚的人能離婚﹖ (第一個P是沒結婚的人﹐第二個P需要結婚才能離婚﹐兩個P是同一個人但不能同一個時間內達成離婚) 解答﹕這個現在不能離婚的人只許要在下一刻達成能離婚的條件(轉換類型﹐先結婚﹐後離婚)就行了。
Swinburne認為錯謬在於(2)﹐因為(2)不是對于每一個P都是正確的。
(2) If at t, P can bring about the existence of a stone of which Pcannot subsequently bring about the rising, then necessarily there isat least one logically contingent state of affairs after t, thedescription of which does not entail that P did not bring it about att, which P is unable at t to bring about (namely, the rising of thestone in question).
发表于 10-11-2008 11:28 AM
。。。
CAN control that P cannot lift the stone“ 可说是个自限的例子巴。
您的解答需要refine(您可以重看分析A至E)一下﹐ 其實有了Swinburne解答的雛形。
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